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Billions of Dollars Allocated to Women’s Projects in Afghanistan:   
Why Their Impact Has Been Limited? 
  
 Women have remained at the forefront of development after the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan due to the involvement of international donors, such as UN agencies, independent 
organizations, and government aid in order to stabilize the country and promote a more 
prosperous society. Gender equality and female empowerment emerged in different initiatives or 
programs both at the policy level and in practice. Now, more than a decade has passed, and 
Afghan women still struggle to have basic rights in most provinces. With billions of dollars 
dedicated to women-related programs, Afghan women still question the efficiency of these 
programs, and question the real impact of these initiatives. Hence, this research aims to provide 
answers to the question, “In spite of massive international aid for women in Afghanistan, how 
has the situation of women not improved as much as expected, yet the same policies and 
mechanisms are maintained?” When considering Afghanistan’s struggle in an ongoing conflict, a 
qualitative research method is used to answer the research question. I have interviewed current 
donor employees, researchers, and NGO partners who have implemented projects that advance 
and support the rights, health, and lives of women to examine the theoretical framework of 
neoliberalism in development, the structure of NGOs in developing countries, and the lack of 
accountability toward beneficiaries. The data from these interviews demonstrate women-related 
projects’ implementation that did not meet its goals and remained insufficient based on project 
designs, current policies in place, and less attention toward female empowerment in the country. 
This research concludes that policies are hard to be changed, but donors continue designing and 
implementing their programs without any need assessments and taking credits for recent 
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 These definitions illustrate terms and words being used in the research as it was used in 
the documents or books related to Afghanistan. These references are helpful before reading the 
paper that can reduce misunderstanding, conceptions, and generalization.  
INGOs: International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) in this paper refer to 
organizations or entities that create and implement independently designed programs/initiatives 
for women in Afghanistan. Although they have received funding from UN agencies and other 
governments, they are in charge of implementation, practices, and outcomes.  
IOs: International Organizations (IOs) in this paper refer to either non-governmental or 
sometimes corporates who are implementing projects related to women that both award and 
receive grants.  
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in this paper refer to local partners who are 
registered in the Ministry of Economy of Afghanistan. NGOs can implement grants from donors, 
government programs, and corporates. These NGOs are obligated to report back to the Ministry 
after the project ends. 
Donor-Driven: The term donor-driven refer to NGOs with policies that are shaped by funder 
expectations. Their implementation is also controlled by the donor who have initially awarded 
the project. These organizations depend on donor aid to implement programs and focus on donor 
satisfaction.  
Projects: In this paper, projects refer to programs and grants that are related to women’s rights 
in capacity building, leadership, health, education, and etc. Some of them are also called 
programs, with sub-sections of small grants; both (projects and programs) are used 
interchangeably.  
Donors: Any institution that works for women in Afghanistan are generally called donors 
because the budget is usually provided by an outside government, corporate, or organizations. 
Donors such as USAID, UN agencies, or DFID are coming together and allocate specific budgets 
to fund projects helping women for Afghanistan.  
UN Agencies: Agencies such UN Women, UNDP, UNH, UNFPA, or WHO are working with 
different governmental ministries and local partners in different thematic areas to help women.  
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Grants:  Grants in this paper refer to the off-budget usually granted by a donor but implemented 




This thesis examines a puzzle. Over the last decade, billions of dollars in aid have been 
spent in Afghanistan to improve women’s lives, and yet, by many measures, there has been very 
limited improvement. Although there have been some positive changes for women, these have 
been arguably less than might be expected, given the massive levels of international support. 
This paper delves into the possible explanations for this puzzle and provides some tentative 
lessons for policymakers, donors, and others who might be interested in developing more 
effective programming for international support for women, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
Neither the international community nor Afghan women would expect rapid and 
complete change in women’s situations both in urban or rural areas. However, with the amount 
of money invested in the country, the welfare of women remains a very significant ongoing 
concern. Different arguments and discussions exist claiming that Afghanistan is an exceptional 
case. What is not an exception is the way in which International Organizations (IO), International 
Non-Government Organizations (INGOs), and other entities managed to create their theories of 
change and argue that these genuinely contribute to Afghanistan’s broader goals of development, 
gender equality, and women empowerment. Many questions have been raised and discussed for 
program implementation processes and those programs that are designed by organizations, such 
as UN Women, creation of Ministry of Women’s Affairs of Afghanistan, PROMOTE project by 
USAID, and others.  
Throughout the years within the Afghan community and the international initiatives who 
donated programs for women, the impact of these initiatives are raising challenges and concerns 
now. Therefore, this paper aims to ask: Why, in spite of massive international aid for women in 
Afghanistan, has the situation of violence against women, the role of law, and women in 
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leadership not improved, yet unsuccessful policies and mechanisms of international donors 
remained the same? This broad question will be channeled through sub-questions: How do 
donors establish funding priorities? What do donors look for in the design of a women-related 
project? What criteria is used to evaluate funding proposal submissions? What monitoring, 
evaluation, and other accountability mechanisms are required during and after a project’s 
implementation to measure and ensure maximum impact? And why are there discrepancies 
between the expectations and deliverables of women-related projects implemented since 2003? I 
argue that lack of accountability toward women with weak mechanisms and policies during 
project implementation prevents gender equality in Afghanistan. As donors maintain their 
approaches that are reportedly not successful, it will create greater challenges for Afghan women 
to overcome.  
This paper first unpacks how funds were allocated to Afghanistan and how it was 
distributed to understand the complexity of such a dilemma. Furthermore, it assesses the 
theoretical framework of development, focusing on feminist scholarship and those who are 
arguing against neoliberal approaches for a faster and better outcome through the humanitarian 
aid. It further elaborates on the concept of partner-donor relationships and lack of accountability 
between the two. Finally, this paper will examine these concepts through qualitative research 
conducted in Afghanistan. Data based in open-ended interviews in this paper will help answer 
the research questions in-depth, highlighting the weak mechanisms of donors, lack of 
accountability from both donors and local partners, and insufficient funding for women’s rights 
in the country. There will not be specific case studies of different programs due to programs 
details and access to accurate information. Donors such as USAID, UN agencies or other 
international charity organizations are not willing to share their program details. Instead, the 
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paper gives concrete examples of different programs that are funded by donation aid and laws 
that are established based on the UN and other entities’ pressure. These examples are inserted 
when an interviewee gave reference to the program. Through these examples, the paper will 
highlight and describe the complexity of an ecosystem that is hard to describe without any 
consensus.  
Achievements and Setbacks for Women 
The international community has invested billions of dollars towards the development of 
women’s rights, thematically: leadership, capacity building, advocacy, and empowerment. They 
required both government and non-government entities to mainstream gender equality in their 
policies and mechanisms. Some women, mostly those who reside in the capital and big cities, 
have experienced degrees of change; similarly, Afghanistan has passed many laws and 
regulations benefiting women for the past ten years or more, but Afghanistan has been ranked by 
various international groups as the “worst place to be a woman”1 or, more recently, the worst 
after Yemen and Syria.2 Economic, educational, geographical, and cultural factors–including but 
certainly not limited to conservative religious doctrines, ethnic tensions, and conflict–are 
impediments to the improvement of Afghan women’s lives. The international intervention (to 
rescue women from an oppressive government) led to what women in Afghanistan experience 
now. Over fifteen years, just one program, the World Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust 
Fund (ARTF), has received more than $10 billion3 from different agencies and governments. 
                                               
1 “The World’s Worst Places to Be a Woman,” Amnesty International USA, June 17, 2011, 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/the-worlds-worst-places-to-be-a-woman/. 
 
2 “And the Worst Country to Be a Woman Is...,” USA Today, March 13, 2018, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/03/08/worst-country-woman/406182002/. 
 
3 “Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: The World Bank Needs to Improve How It Monitors Implementation, 




Unfortunately, in its April 2018 report4, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR), which monitors U.S. spending in Afghanistan, cited misuse of ARTF 
funds due to a lack of transparency, monitoring, and accounting of its funding. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Economy of Afghanistan, on its most recent budget reports 
in 2016, concluded that the amount of money spent directly or indirectly are beneficial to the 
people of Afghanistan.5 Figure 1 demonstrates the amount of money spent by international 
organizations, the Afghan government, and local partners, in a year.6 The amount spent by 
donors are greater than what the government spent. However, donors have mostly granted the 
budget to local partners. Donor administrative costs are excluded from the same amount. The 
amount of funding entering the country is divided in two categories: on-budget and off-budget. 
Off-budget is spent directly by the funders, but on-budget is spent by the government. Based on 
the IOs’ and INGOs’ country offices’ reports to the Ministry of Economy, most of the money 
including administrative costs are controlled by the donors. Independent programs for women’s 
empowerment and equality was the catalyst resulting in the establishment of many NGOs. 
Afghanistan witnessed an increase in NGO registration since 2000. In 2000, there were 53 
international and 103 domestic NGOs.7 According to the Ministry of Economy (MoEC), the total 
                                               
 
4 “Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: The World Bank Needs to Improve How It Monitors Implementation, 
Share Information, and Determines the Impact of Donor Contribution.” 
 
5 2016 NGOs Annual Activities Report. Publication no. 1. Directorate of Non-profit Organizations, Ministry 




7 David, F. Mitchell. “NGO Presence and Activity in Afghanistan, 2000 – 2014: A Provincial Level Dataset.” 





number of NGOs in 2016 was  2,070: including 1,702 national and 212 international.8 In 
addition, 303 national and 11 international organizations were inactive according to the MoEC 
report.9 More NGOs started closing after the US withdrew from Afghanistan in 2014. US 
withdrawal also caused donors to reduce their funding and the government could not assist these 
NGOs.10 Some also remained inactive in the country and hoped to receive grants in the future. 
These inactive organizations are those who cannot receive grants versus the bigger organizations 
receiving grants double the usual amount. As of 2017, there are also 2,700 associations that 
encompass “communities, unions, councils, assemblies and organizations.”11 Grant distribution 
among these NGOs are based on their backgrounds and previews programs implemented in the 
same thematic area. NGOs who are more in the provinces have less access to the donors’ offices 
and struggle to receive funding.  
 
Figure 1 One Year Budget 
 
                                               
8 2016 NGOs Annual Activities Report. Publication no. 1. Directorate of Non-profit Organizations, Ministry 
Economy of Afghanistan. Kabul: MoEC, 2016. 1-88. 
 
9 Ministry of Economy of Afghanistan. 
 
10 Arghandiwal, Miriam. As Foreign Aid Dries Up, Afghan NGOs Fight to Survive. Report. Reuters. July 5, 2012. 
Accessed Sept 7, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-aid-tokyo/as-foreign-aid-dries-up-afghan-
ngos-fight-to-survive-idUSBRE8640G720120705 
 
11 “Civic Freedom Monitor: Afghanistan” (The International Center for non-for-Profit Law, September 2013), 
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/afghanistan.html. 
 
Total Amount: $851.59 Million




Based on the same report, Figure 2 shows the number of projects implemented either by 
international or national organizations that were reported to the Ministry.12 It shows an increase 
in funding, and both the international actors and Afghanistan are claiming more achievements. 
These projects are implemented in six thematic areas. 555 projects are implemented in the Health 
sector with 1,159 projects in Social Immunity, 51 projects in Infrastructure, 238 projects in Good 
Governance, 388 projects in Education, and 174 projects in Agriculture and Livestock.13  
 
 
Figure 2 Total Number of  projects implemented 
There is not enough data on the number of women related projects in different provinces. Based 
on the data presented in the government report, the assumption is that there has been an increase 
in the amount of spend within a year. It also shows an increase in local partners’ access to more 
projects compared to the year before, as the report mentioned. One interpretation could be that 
dividing the number of projects by the total budget; enough money is spent in a year. The report 
has shown enough details on sector-related projects, but it does not show specific details on the 
                                               
12 2016 NGOs Annual Activities Report. Publication no. 1. Directorate of Non-profit Organizations, Ministry 
Economy of Afghanistan. Kabul: MoEC, 2016.15. 
 











money distributed among partners. If this model has been practiced in the same way in past 
years, it indicates that the government has been lacking in monitoring these projects and making 
sure that corruption does not influence female initiatives.  
Further achievements for women are in-laws and policies. According to the 2004 
constitution, women and men have equal rights before the law. These laws and regulations 
became one of the most progressive steps for women’s rights in the country after creating a State 
that is both democratic and Islamic. Under international pressure, the Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs (MoWA) became an entity for women. Having a 27% quota for women in the country’s 
parliament,14 Afghanistan also ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). These new mechanisms allowed gender 
mainstreaming on the governmental level.15  
Moreover, based on its commitment to CEDAW, MoWA developed Afghanistan 
National Development Strategy (ANDS) in 2008 for women’s empowerment.16 Besides, the 
National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA) (as a compliment/ endorsement 
to ANDS) became an important document made possible by MoWA. NAPWA expires in 2018, 
and other mechanisms are being discussed to replace it.17 The president of Afghanistan also 
signed the Elimination of Violence against Women Law (EVAW) in 2009. Additionally, 
Afghanistan’s commitment to a human rights regime allowed the country to focus on women’s 
                                               
14 Sarah Pugh and Saeed Parto, “Women in the Government: Needing More Than Numbers,” Research Report 
(Kabul Afghanistan: Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization, November 2017), 9, www.appro.org.af. 
 
15 Pugh and Parto, 9. 
 
16 Ahmad Shaheer Anil, Melike Karlidag, and Saeed Parto, “Implementation of the National Action Plan for Women 
in Afghanistan” (Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization, March 2014), http://appro.org.af/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/214589487-NAPWA-Assessment-March-15-2014.pdf. 
 




rights in the peace process. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) became the 
critical entity pushing for women in the peace process. For the advancement of the United 
Nation’s Resolution 1325 – Women Peace and Security’s National Action Plan (NAP 1325) was 
designed to be implemented.18 Unfortunately, based on many studies,19 these laws remained on 
paper with limited progress at the local level. 
There is a struggle between policies and practices. The purpose of these mechanisms was 
to emphasize “gender mainstreaming as a crosscutting theme in all government activities and 
policies,” according to Afghanistan’s Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO).20 
APPRO’s report concluded that women are 28.7% of parliamentarians in both houses, 32% of 
teachers in the education sector, 24.2% in the public sector, 21.9% of civil servants, 11.2% of 
judges, and 1.8% of police officers.21  One may argue that these numbers are showing a vast 
improvement compared to what Afghanistan had before the Taliban or during the civil war. It is 
a valid and easy argument to make in the international community. I debate and challenge such 
an argument, noting that these numbers are greatly commercialized in a way that attracts donor 
interest in the country and continues their work while knowing that the amount of waste is higher 
than what the country has achieved. Meanwhile, Afghanistan did not have access to technology 
or reporting mechanisms to measure the status women status in the country in the past years, nor 
the government has had a robust mechanism for measuring the struggle women go through daily. 
Recently, anti-harassment regulation was passed because the Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
                                               
18 Pugh and Parto, “Women in the Government: Needing More Than Numbers.” 
 
19 APPRO has done many researches added in this paper, in addition, go to the data analysis to read more about how 
these laws have failed through the years. 
 
20 APPRO conducted NAPWA's assessment to find out its impact in the country, Anil, Karlidag, and Parto, 7. 
 
21 The data in this report is included from Central Statistical Office (CSO) Pugh and Parto, “Women in the 
Government: Needing More Than Numbers,” 9. 
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noticed that women struggle in the workplace. These numbers showing achievements in the 
education system, the number of girls in school, or percentage of women in the police sector 
exist and have been championed in the past five years; however, the quality of these positions 
and opportunities are still questionable.22 In leadership, women are not usually the decision 
makers but are used symbolically as deputies in an office with less authority to make important 
decisions. Similarly, women in other sectors are celebrated. However, their participation in 
different sectors is problematic. For instance, women in the police are facing harassment, while 
educational opportunities for girls or jobs for female teachers in rural areas are rare.  
It is also tough for donors to know the communities that their respective charities serve. 
Needs assessment has not taken place in the country, neither by the government nor by donors. 
Not knowing beneficiaries and their needs, it is rough to solely celebrate these numbers without 
understanding the quality of work and sustainability of different programs. Reports and 
assessments are coming out highlighting the lack of accountability within different programs and 
projects related to women. For instance, SIGAR’s reports on USAID projects are helpful to 
understand how different programs are insufficient that also hardly meet their initial goals.23 A 
confidential report came out recently on Canada’s $ 5.6M girls’ education program with 
                                               
22 Parto, Saeed. And Pugh, Sarah. Due to the space limitation, see APPRO’s report from three provinces in Women 
in Government that focused on women’s positions in the government offices: http://appro.org.af/publication/women-
in-government-needing-more-than-numbers/  
 
23 For more  SIGAR reports on USAID projects in Afghanistan, please read SIGAR’s publications on different 




negligible results.24 Activists have put pressure on Canada’s government for better monitoring 
and evaluation of its programs for women in the country.25 
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back 
The literature review is split into two parts. The first set is transactional literature focused 
on the problem framed by the Western world through a neoliberal concept of service delivery for 
quicker outcomes, producing feminist NGOs and country offices of IOs and INGOs that award 
projects, produce new platforms, and report signs of progresses. The second set is organizational, 
and accountability literature focused on NGOs on the ground that is born based on donor 
expectations, such as South American NGOs. These works also illustrate the relationship 
between donors and NGOs with weak mechanisms practiced, lack of accountability among the 
partners and donors, and their impact on the beneficiaries.   
Scholars such as Jane Jaquette, Makau Mutua, Glen W. Wright and Sonia E. Alvarez are 
arguing neoliberal approach within aid agencies, that emphasizes on developing policies for third 
world countries that are not getting to the roots of problems in the developing countries. These 
authors illustrate a gap between theory and practice that has created an ecosystem which is hard 
to manage or understand. For instance, Jaquette, a feminist scholar and author of 
“Women/Gender and Development: The Growing Gap between Theory and Practice,” argues 
that after developing the terms “Women in Development” (WID) and “Gender in Development” 
(GID) in the past decades, liberal egalitarian US feminists hoped that the US Agency for 
                                               
24 Dean, Beeby. “Report slams $ 5.6M Canadian program for Afghan women.” August 28, 2018. 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/afghanistan-women-canada-global-affairs-banerjee-1.4800495  
 





International Development (USAID) could take the approach further.26 Feminist theories 
remained popular among practitioners in adapting new strategies and policies. While this 
approach received many backlashes later, Jaquette further argues that both WID and GID faced a 
challenge of neoliberalism and “demand for a structural or transformative change.”27 USAID and 
United Nations (UN) reinforced their commitments after the Mexico Conference of 1975 
produced the Program of Action.28 Member states adopting such a metaphor expected 
modernization friendly to women’s achievement. In contrast, since Cold War, Jaquette writes, 
“multilateral and bilateral aid agencies did not challenge capitalism, it is hardly surprising given 
that western foreign assistance programs were designed in part to counter the appeal of 
communism to the underdeveloped countries of the movements of the 1960s.”29 In the 1980s, 
with postmodernism and in some cases post-colonialism, feminists in the south started 
challenging the fact that women in the global south were seen as “helpless victims of 
patriarchy.”30  
With the dichotomy between the North and South and more NGOs to take these feminist 
mandates, Sonia Alvarez similarly argues that NGO-ization is more often mixed with the donor-
driven approach in this field.31 She writes, “NGO-ization entailed national and global 
                                               
26 Jane S. Jaquette, “Women/Gender and Development: The Growing Gap Between Theory and Practice,” Studies in 
Comparative International Development 52, no. 2 (June 2017): 42, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-017-9248-8. 
 
27 Jaquette, “Women/Gender and Development.” 
 
28 Jane S. Jaquette, “Women/Gender and Development: The Growing Gap Between Theory and Practice,” Studies in 











neoliberalism’s active promotion and official sanctioning of particular organizational forms and 
practices among feminist organizations and other sectors of civil society.”32 Alvarez recognized 
three trends that potentially helps in the creation, and functionality of these NGOs. Through 
history, States looked at these NGOs as experts in feminism, instead of looking at them as 
citizens/groups fighting for women’s rights. Besides, neoliberal states viewed these NGOs as 
forces for gender policy matters and assumed that these NGOs served societal constituencies. 
They may or may not have had the capacity to do so; these NGOs found legitimate ground 
within the State. Finally, while these NGOs became a force for gender equality, most programs 
were implemented by offices that sometimes jeopardized the fact that NGOs could not monitor 
policies or advocate for change.33  
 On the other hand, Mutua, in his early writing “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The 
metaphor of Human Rights,” explains the “human rights corpus,” and argues that UN agencies, 
INGOs, and other actors constructed the discourse as “black-and-white construction that pits 
good against evil.”34 This argument is tied back with Jaquette’s argument about feminists 
framing the issue in third world countries. Mutua believes that the reality between the State as a 
the main actor versus the culture of that State in a third world country is very complex. He 
further elaborates his point by saying that “it is not the state per se that is barbaric but the cultural 
foundation of the state.”35 He refers to how western countries understood third world cultures 
and norms. His second metaphor depicts the relationship between the victims and the protectors. 
                                               
32 Alvarez, 175. 
 
33 Alvarez, 177. 
 
34 For Mutua’s argument and his in-depth analysis of these three concept see: Makau Mutua, “Savages, Victims, and 






To him, third world countries play the role of victims and Western countries of protectors. In his 
terms, victims are the most vulnerable figures who do not have power but the innocence that is 
negated either by the State or the existing culture of that State.36 The “safeguard” in his argument 
is different INGOs, UN entities, and others that use their skills and approaches to “save” the 
victims. Lastly, to Mutua, the savior is more of a European concept that has remained to 
“protect” “from the tyrannies of the State, tradition, and culture.”37 These metaphors easily 
formed the distinction between the Western and the rest of the world. These metaphors and racial 
hierarchies affect the human rights sphere. Third world countries adjusted themselves by 
accepting newer agendas. These agendas could be perpetuated by local NGOs that oppose any 
violations either by their own culture or the State. These NGOs are fighting for a better society; 
however, Mutua argues that these NGOs are imported based on Western values.38 This practice 
to save the “others” by INGOs allows cultures to be stigmatized; in addition, it allows 
humanitarian aid to flow while it may or may not have a more significant impact. INGOs are 
shaping the conversation in order to protect human rights through advocacy and reporting 
mechanisms.39 Again, to him, it is reasonable to make a parallel between colonialism and the 
creation of human rights as an ideal platform for progress and changes.40 It is a very particular 
script the Third World is asked to follow based on Mutua’s argument.41 
                                               
36 Mutua, 2. 
 
37 Mutua, 2. 
 
38 Mutua, 8. 
 
39 Mutua, 12. 
 
40 Mutua, 19. 
 




As soon as these NGOs are shaped, other authors such as Glen Wright calls it 
corporatization of NGOs. Wright argues in the article “NGOs and Western Hegemony: Causes 
for Concern and Ideas for Change” that when NGOs become bureaucratic and act like machines, 
it runs in the hand of an elite group that leads to a business.42 Since these elite groups are 
difficult to overturn or question the accountability and transparency of their approaches and how 
they are aiming to help the people, they fail and distance themselves from the beneficiaries. 
Wright is not against the fact that these elite groups have the skill to run an organization, but to 
Wright, this system privatizes the charity work that needs to happen. Due to accessibility and 
limited relations, NGOs remain in the hand of a few groups that decrease the impact of projects 
but instead such group become fatter and more substantial. 
Moreover, these previous authors have not focused on the way these country offices 
play a crucial role between the beneficiaries and Head Quarters (HQ). They instead looked at 
the policy level, laying out the way the ecosystem works from a neoliberal point of view. In 
most countries the relationship between IOs, INGOs, HQs is a challenge that would reduce 
impact, and Country Offices function as the most trusted entities to award, implement and 
report back on achievements and accomplishments. Many practices in South American and 
African countries later being practiced in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Susanna 
Campbell, in her recent book “Global Governance and Local Peace: Accountability and 
Performance in International Peacebuilding,” researched in Burundi,43 Most of her arguments 
                                               
42 Glen W. Wright, “NGOs and Western Hegemony: Causes for Concern and Ideas for Change,” Development in 
Practice 22, no. 1 (February 2012): 128, https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2012.634230. 
 






are relevant to the current ways donors have shaped their policies for Afghan women. It is 
relevant in two ways. One: Afghanistan started its peace process with the Taliban, in more 
focused on women’s inclusion. Two: peacebuilding is not possible without the inclusion of 
women. Afghanistan committed to UNSCR 1325. Her argument, and understanding the 
complications within country offices who are analyzing, reporting, and awarding projects, is a 
step closer to the complexity of this research. In her book, she argues that international actors are 
more accountable toward their HQ or international actors, but less accountable to the 
beneficiaries and people who need the most help. She further argues that the “variation in 
country office’s peacebuilding performance results, in part, from informal local accountability 
arrangements made by individuals country-office. For country offices to achieve local-level 
change, they have to delegate authority to a representative group of local stakeholders who hold 
the country office accountable for achieving its local aims.”44 In her argument, IO and INGOs 
are failing due to the country office not being open to local actors’ feedbacks; it is structured in a 
way that the country office does not rely on the local’s performance but maintain their top-down 
approach.45 
She claims that standards for implementing projects within IO and INGOs are “based on 
the assumption that if one develops a project description with the right analysis, the right 
strategy, the right project aims, and the right measurement indicators and anticipate the right 
risks, that project will achieve its desired outcomes.”46 The country office matters due to its 
functionality on the country level. Campbell argues that these offices are the operational unit that 
                                               
44 Campbell, 4. 
 
45 Campbell, 5. 
 




carries the objectives of the HQ whether it fails or succeeds. She explains further, saying that 
these offices are responsible for understanding the local context and provide crucial information 
in order to develop better strategies.47 Each country dedicates a specific budget to spend in 
different countries. The responsibility of these country offices is to spend that amount allocated. 
Avoiding local feedback, designing projects based on the HQ interest without local assessment 
leads to failure of projects.  
Furthermore, these authors agree on the fact that the lack of accountability of donors 
decreases the prioritization of beneficiaries. While country offices function independently within 
a country, NGOs that ultimately play a role in the donors’ community have their structures that 
are explained in the following section. These structures and office management with higher 
capacity are shaped by the donors’ expectation which generates an extra layer that lowers the 
impact of projects on the beneficiaries.  
Organizational Theory and Accountably Structure 
 
Accountability structures within donors and partners are different. The Literature on 
organizations and accountability structures are divided. For instance, organizational theory 
mainly focuses on the ways in which an organization functions. Accountability structure, on the 
other hand, is a sub-section within organizational theory that looks at both the NGOs and donors’ 
accountability mechanisms and policies. Eric Werker, Faisal Ahmed, Karen Rauh, Emma 
Mawdsley and David Lewis are theorizing the way in which organizations are functioning. These 
authors are not focusing on the accountability structure within organizations although they are 
interconnected. Other authors in the accountability structure are complimenting the 
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organizational theory in understanding how organizations are functioning and highlights the 
importance of both NGOs and donors accountability for a better impact in development.  
First, authors such as Eric Werker and Faisal Ahmed define NGOs a “group of players 
who are active in the efforts of international development and increasing the welfare of poor 
people in developing countries. NGOs work both independently, and alongside bilateral aid 
agencies from developed countries, private sectors infrastructure operates, self-help associations, 
and local governments.”48 Based on their definition, organizations are idealized as bringing good 
without putting political or profitable means in place.49 Furthermore, other authors argued in the 
previous chapter that NGOs involved in development is not a new concept: NGOs spread liberal 
values. The bulk of funds flow “through NGOs remains focused on basic humanitarian assistance 
and development”50 according to Werker and Ahmed. The growth of organization through 
history would not be the result of economic growth; however, they believe that it is the 
interaction between “secular trends, ideas, and technology.”51  
Other authors like Karen Rauh and Emma Mawdsley,52 in the article “Foreign Donors, 
and Organizational Processes: Passive NGO Recipients or Strategic Actors,” argue that 
organizational theory and organizational culture produce an intense relationship between the 
donor and partner in the world of development, which may or may not benefit the beneficiaries. 
According to these authors, theory traditionally focused on firms, schools, and hospitals. It 
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somehow has not been applied to the NGO-donors relationship.53 In any organization, specific 
procedures and mechanisms are required to achieve goals. These procedures are claimed to be 
the foundation for the increase of accountability, transparency and a security factor for the 
misappropriation of funds. The relationship between donors and implementing partners remains 
vital in the case of reporting mechanisms. On the one hand, it creates a landscape of 
accountability and transparency. On the other hand, Rauh argues that the increase of paper-based 
analytical tools rewarding organizations who produce the best documentation impacts other 
organizations that lack these skills but bring a positive change.54  
Further, the organizational culture within organization theory refers to “shared values and 
practices which evolved within organizations.”55 Organizational culture has not been around for 
a very long time, and it influenced societal cultures by individuals who have worked within an 
organization. Culture plays a vital role in understanding the way procedures are developed and 
how shared visions are carried out successfully.56 Four styles in such culture are identified by 
authors such as Lewis, et al. Self-employed individuals and those who are working for 
themselves. “Task culture” is the second style mainly based on people within the organization 
focused on different tasks; maintaining the same goal. “Role culture” is mainly defined as roles 
that are set within the organization, mostly in a hierarchical structure. Finally, in a specific set-up 
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in which an organization has a leader, and others follow,57 both donors and NGOs’ expectations 
affect beneficiaries.  
Second, within this structure, accountability mechanisms are crucial to development 
projects. In the accountability literature, authors like Poonam Smith-Sreen and Lisa Jorden58 
argue that accountability structure is a foundation for the donor/implementer relationship. The 
definition of accountability was initially used for money a government was to spend responsibly. 
Smith-Sreen defines the traditional kind of accountability actors such as “project managers [who] 
are familiar, deal with financial accounting.”59 In contrast, within the government, public 
accountability means the public money spent by the government. Within NGOs and for donors, 
the same measurement plays a role.60 
Similarly, although donors have not focused on the ratio of accountability as a cause of 
corruption, authors such as Lisa Jordan argue that accountability in NGOs always requires that 
they should be held accountable for specific actions and circumstances.61 Accountability by itself 
is a relationship between one group toward others, or certain groups toward one entity, according 
to Jordan and Tuijl.62 Within these defined NGOs, these authors write, “accountability defines a 
relationship between an organization and a set of stakeholders and assumes that being responsive 
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to those stakeholders will be beneficial to the NGO and its mandate.”63 Furthermore, 
accountability mechanisms for NGOs also refer to organizations that are held responsible 
externally, these authors argued,64 which help to establish better vision, mission, and goals. 
While international funding becomes larger, the discussion of accountability within NGOs and 
between academics rises.65 These authors argue that NGOs usually demand the accountability of 
a State; on the other hand, it recently became a demand that they not only show they have 
focused on the State or a business but also on the functionality of an NGO that is demanding to 
“represent the poor and marginalized”66 groups, according to Dorothea and Schmitz. 
Categories of accountability are crucial to Smith-Sreen. One, financial accountability, 
which is how the fund is received and used by the implementer. According to Smith-Sreen, 
“when accountability of an NGO is evaluated only through its financial management the purpose 
for which the funds are distributed may get displaced. Although accounting for funds is integral 
to overall organization accountability, it should not be either the sole or the major criterion.”67 
Two: project outcomes are critical. When the funding is increased for NGOs as they become the 
implemented partners, the outcome of each project is also crucial to the development efforts. 
Three: social accountability, when the organization is representing a community, such that the 
NGO should be accountable while using and representing certain groups.  
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For project efficiency, and better impact, face-to-face interaction is the best approach 
between donors and partners helping to enhance upward and downward accountability 
mechanisms based on Campbell’s argument.68 There is a hierarchical accountability mechanism 
within IO, INGOs and other independent donors. To Campbell, it is a formal setting where it 
allows the country office to upward accountability. Upward accountability is accounting to those 
on top, “generally the country’s office principles are located outside of the country in which it 
operates, and often have limited knowledge of the local contexts that the country office 
encounters.”69 It also becomes a routine that, to her, raises a challenge for the office active in a 
specific country. Regarding feedback, it does not allow the country office to decrease the gap 
between what their HQ aims for and their outcomes. On the one hand, it allows for reporting 
easier; on the other hand, it does not allow for more focus on beneficiaries.  In this relationship, 
there are rare cases in which development discourses tend to stay silent about the subject that 
could initially show corruption and other issues of unprofessionalism.70 Usually, NGOs are 
assessed based on their activities. Smith-Sreen argues that the success of NGOs is not assessed 
by “the process it has utilized, but by the total benefits accrued by its members.”71 Such 
processes adopted by the implementing NGO are means of achieving outcomes. On the other 
hand, Smith-Sreen claims that, in recent years, participation has lost its meaning because NGOs 
mainly focus on showing the donor organizations stronger basis for receiving funding. Smith-
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Sreen writes, “understanding these local organizations seeking funds for their efforts tend to 
emphasize their commitment to women’s development and the participatory processes adopted 
by them.”72  
Usually, projects designed by donors are what practitioners have practiced in the past 
years. This approach has caused backlashes some argue that donor-driven approach may not 
work the same in every developing country. Paolo de Renzio argues that this model is wrong. 
“Foreign aid focuses on the wrong things,” he writes, “too often, aid-financed projects and 
programs are decided and designed based on donor priorities and on models drawn on either 
some past successful experience of the donor country or on some abstract notion of recognized 
international best practice without much attention to local needs and priorities or to the context in 
which they are meant to work and achieve impact.”73 Also, aid supported by other countries 
undermines governance and institutional buildings. This direct funding spent by the government 
favors domestic complexities which may in one way weaken the government. We have many 
examples in recent conflict countries like Afghanistan and Iraq that rely on donor aid. Donor aid 
is designed in a way that allows States to become sustainable or not depended upon foreign aid.  
Accountability mechanisms play crucial roles for a transparent change. Renzio states that 
there is tension between those who fund and those who receive the funds. On the one hand, 
accountability allows better impact; on the other hand, according to Renzio, “donors have often 
relied on fragmented and uncoordinated projects with a parallel management system that allow 
them to keep close control over how money is spent.”74 Within the concept of the donor-partner 
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relationship, women’s organizations and funding dedicated to women’s projects are essential in 
considering why developing countries are much weaker and less educated than developed 
countries. Lack of education and poverty resulting in a secure system of patriarchy in which most 
donors try to work on women’s empowerment, women’s leadership, and women’s capacity 
building. Implementers in the field usually argue that developmental approaches are not 
successful if women do not become part of the movement. Based on these arguments, it is 
challenging to see the changes occurring on the ground versus what IOs and INGOs are claiming 
to bring change to these women. Therefore, the rest of this paper will examine these theories and 
mechanisms created and practiced in Afghanistan while these policies were not successful in 
other countries.  
Assessment, Examination, and Findings 
The data in this research is both primary and secondary. Qualitative research is used to 
explain how IOs, INGOs, and other donor agencies have been operating in Afghanistan 
through different project designs and initiatives as a complement to the government’s 
programs. Participants in this research have varied backgrounds and expertise. For instance, I 
conducted interviews with individuals/professionals who worked with local NGOs and donor 
communities such as UN Women, USAID, and other independent INGOs. Additionally, I 
interviewed researchers and women activists in order to vary my data, reduce biases and 
enable more transparent outcomes.  
This research was conducted in two phases. The first phase was during my winter trip 
to Afghanistan. The goal of that trip was to understand and narrow down my research topic. It 
also allowed a smoother transition to the second phase through specific questions and 
methods that were approved by the university. The second phase of this research was 
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conducted with semi-structured interviews for more than a month in Afghanistan between 
May-July, 2018. In addition to the interviews, most of the secondary data was recommended 
by researchers and practitioners in the field. Some of the documents are in the Persian 
language (I used my best Persian skills to read and add relevent data to elaborate my points.) 
If there were direct translations, I added the quote in the footnotes with the Persian alphabet, 
so that it is more transparent. 
There were many challenges in the field. First, Afghanistan is still in conflict. Assessing 
and collecting data was dangerous. The proposal was not initially approved by Columbia 
University’s Human Resource Protection Office (HRPO) and the IRB. Risk management was a 
struggle between the researcher and the HRPO. Final approval of the research proposal had 
limitations that allowed the research to take place only in Kabul with no access to other 
provinces. On the other hand, all the donors’ country offices are in Kabul, which made it easier 
to conduct interviews. Furthermore, recruiting participants to become part of the research was 
not easy. For instance, donors such as USAID were not interested in participating and did not 
allow its employees to be interviewed. Some donors that gave interviews requested to remain 
anonymous or their data is used for background information only. Researchers on the ground had 
a clear understanding of issues related to donor aid distribution, the work process, and donors’ 
work style in different areas due to foreign-made mechanisms and procedures. Interviewees in 
this research are assessed and selected based on their expertise and experience. Their age, 
gender, and other identities were not crucial in answering the research questions.  
Based on interviews with individuals in Kabul, the following sections will demonstrate what it 
means to make policy that helps women in Afghanistan, how projects have failed, and what the 
specific obstacles that reduced the impact of donors aid in the grassroots are. 
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The Failure of Laws/Policies for Women in Afghanistan 
 Among many other obstacles women face in Afghanistan, violence against women is still 
rising. Donors and the government have worked to create shelters, Elimination of Violence 
against Women (EVAW) courts in the districts, and train police officers in registering cases and 
helping those who face different kinds of violence. It is due to the increase of violence cases 
across the provinces, and the international community’s pressure to prioritize ending violence 
against women. Overall, policies and mechanisms followed based on international conventions 
or resolutions. Research shows that national law still struggles to help decrease violence cases. In 
the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) report of 2017, it was 
concluded that 4,340 cases of violence against women were registered at the provincial level.75 
These are not the total number of cases as many remain unreported. This report shows an 
increase in violence against women in the country by 11.3% compared to the previous year .76 
Most of the cases reported are physical, extrajudicial killing, sexual, verbal, economic, and other 
forms of violence. Violence against women in Afghanistan is a danger to the social and cultural 
improvement of local communities. With EVAW law and district courts to deal with these cases, 
there is still a long way to go.  It shows that women’s security in the domestic and  in the public 
sphere is in danger.  
Additionally, many NGOs and donors facilitated many projects to empower women and 
build the capacity of professionals dealing with violence cases in court or police stations. That 
mechanism failed due to many cases not being registered or instead referred to the local elders or 
traditional councils. Violence against women has been embedded in Afghan culture for many 
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years. However, after the Taliban regime, access to media allowed violence against women cases 
to receive public attention and many have tried to work around it while law at the local level is 
not in its best practice. For instance, United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) published a report in 2011 that looked at local districts to assess the effectiveness of 
the national law, especially EVAW which was celebrated for many years as a progressive step in 
the country’s history.77 After the Taliban regime, UNAMA consistently supported women, and 
its four priority areas focused on women’s rights and combating violence against women. 
UNAMA also releases periodic reports on violence against women in the country. In its 2011 
report, from legal cases in 22 provinces with higher concern in the implementation of EVAW 
law by police officers, judges, and prosecutors, more cases were registered compared to its 
previous report. That is positive, the report said.78 However, the amount of reporting incidences 
in the whole year (4,010) explains that the number of cases resolved by the courts remains very 
low in 16 provinces.79 Based on such statistics in all cases, legal procedures were not followed. 
Instead, the police and prosecutors referred these cases to community councils (jirgas or shuras). 
On the other hand, this practice “often undermined implementation of the EVAW law and 
reinforced harmful practices,”80 according to this report. Not that these policies are only weak or 
impractical in the local level, EVAW law does not include specific articles on complaint 
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procedures. For example, the State cannot take action if the family members or the woman 
herself will not file a complaint. Instead, women are pressured to withdraw their cases to respect 
family honor, which does not allow the government to investigate further.81  
Afghanistan, with its weak government and mechanisms for gender equality and human 
rights, falls short of its obligation to the CEDAW Committee and other ratified human rights 
conventions. The government has been using security as an obstacle for development or stability. 
Instead, the government has tried to advocate for women’s rights in different conferences such as 
the October 5-6, 2016 Brussels’ conference on Afghanistan. It encountered 75 countries and 26 
international organizations.82 Among all, the amount of achievement presented in this 
conference, Afghanistan presented its challenges and specific areas that needed more focus. For 
instance, among other challenges, women’s rights remain a priority, knowing that the 
international donors would not support the government if women’s rights were not on its top list. 
One of the challenges highlighted was family rights. In many cases, inheritance, dowry, alimony, 
and divorce remain challenges for women in the domestic sphere. Further, these challenges also 
include physical violence and in increase of women’s mortality rate.83 While donors tried to 
provide shelter for those who are leaving their houses or remain homeless, these shelters add 
another layer of disrespect to women who return to their communities. Also, the government has 
created Family Response Units (FRUs) within the National Police that are not well understood in 
the community. APPRO, in its research, demonstrated that violence against women has increased 
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due to men’s unemployment,84 instability, poverty, and traditional practices with a weak role of 
law.   
APPRO has been doing constant research in order to assess progress in the country and 
the government’s obligations to international conventions, national programs, and mechanisms. 
In its 2017 report on “Women in Government: Needing More Than Numbers,” shows that 
women’s rights has not been improved in many provinces. The research is from Kabul, Balkh, 
and Herat provinces. The study concluded that although the number of women seeming in the 
national and provincial government increased, the quality of their participation is still a question. 
It also concluded that in these three provinces, not only are there fewer women but these women 
have lower positions compare to men.85 Furthermore, in all three provinces, women are not 
confident about their participation as an opportunity to their daily lives, but they “argued that 
women are mostly not involved in decision-making processes, and that, at present, their 
participation is symbolic.”86 This research shows how women’s participation in cities is not 
moving forward but creates backlash and damage to women’s reputation in the communities. 
Furthermore, APPRO implemented two projects under “Citizens for NAP 1325” which 
was funded by Oxfam Afghanistan, and “NAP 1325 Monitor” which was funded by the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). These two projects looked at NAP 
1325 at the national level while donors started funding this action plan concerning women, peace 
and security.87 APPRO, in this report, underlines the importance of past mistakes that put 
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women’s rights in the country at risk. The report is concerned with “unsustainable or ill-
conceived programming and advocacy [that] could have severe adverse consequences for the 
situation of women, men, boys and girls, and gender relations in general.”88 Steering Committee, 
Technical Working Group, Advisory Group, Women Peace and Security Working Group are the 
specific bodies of NAP 1325 implementation. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry 
of Finance are the key management actors in the implementation process. Based on APPRO’s 
assessment at the local level, there has not been any mechanisms or M&E procedures to evaluate 
the impact of NAP 1325. The reporting process does not specifically include 39 indicators that 
already included in NAP 1325. However, the report says, “the risk of under-reporting failure to 
perform and thus of the reports having no utility regarding lessons learned or taking corrective 
action.”89 Although the Ministry of Finance determines the budget for implementing NAP 1325 
in Afghanistan, it receives many budget requests that are not justified.90 The same organization 
made another assessment of NAP 1325 in its third monitoring cycle. Women’s awareness across 
the country on NAP 1325 is not very high. The research examined 12 provinces with 29 districts 
in NAP 1325 impact.91 Figure 3 is based on APPRO research and shows women’s awareness of 
NAP 1325 in different provinces. Compare to the previous assessment; it shows that there is 
somehow an increase in select provinces, such as Nangarhar and Khost provinces, where they 
have some information about this document.92 Between Samangan, Laghman, Khost and Herat 
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provinces, Herat has better security than the three other provinces. Khost has experienced the 
most conflict, but Laghman remains undeveloped.  
On the one hand, this chart is essential in understanding the imbalanced awareness 
programs for NAP 1325 across the country. On the other hand, raising awareness is not an 
immediate solution for the action plan’s objectives. The peace process became symbolic while 
conflict has been continued.  
 
Figure 3, Women Awareness on NAP 1325, the chart from APPRO’s report93 
  
The researches makes a strong point about the role of law and how laws are not active at 
the local level. However, research in Afghanistan has not focused on donors’ project design, 
M&E mechanisms or donors-partner relationship. Most researches and international actor 
assume that culture and customary laws are causing programs to fail. Organizations such as 
APPRO and AREU are receiving projects to conduct these reports. They are still experiencing 
their policies to be donors-driven. Second, research organizations may not be able to receive a 
project that shows the insufficiencies of a donor in the country because the organization will not 
receive more funding and no one wants to destroy its reputation. These NGOs are also convinced 
                                               




that the better capacity an NGO has, the larger projects they receive. Better capacity means an 
NGO can produce better policies that are aligned with donors’ expectations and management 
skills.  
1. Tangible changes to women’s rights after the Taliban Regime, facilitated by donors 
 At the beginning of this research, I highlighted areas of progress women achieved in 
Afghanistan and also showed how these changes are used in many conferences, and meetings to 
advocate for further assistance. While having these achievements, which are still fragile and may 
collapse if donors’ aid discontinued, NGOs that have been rich by now still narrate the story of 
these years as a positive period. I do not argue that these positive conversations should not be 
encouraged, but these conversations may not change the original narrative in the country that 
influences policies in the wrong direction. According to the data, whether or not the changes 
coming in the country are satisfying, is based on how much was allocated; whether or not the 
international community played a role, most of the interviewees I spoke to agreed that laws 
related to women such as EVAW law, anti-harassment regulation, and other mechanisms are an 
achievement and that both the Afghan people and the international donors expected these reward. 
Women’s achievement could be divided in two ways, a UN Women employee argued. One, on 
paper concerning laws and regulations, there is a considerable change compared to what 
Afghanistan had during the Taliban regime. Within these “progressive” laws, the interviewee 
argued that there is still discrimination against women that is justified by the legal system. 
Second, the implementation of these laws is a challenge for both the donor community and the 
government of Afghanistan. Consider marriage and divorce: “While men and women have equal 
rights to marriage, and they have some equal responsibilities before, after, and during the 
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marriage; unfortunately in our civil code or civil law [it] is derived from Sharia principles.”94 
Therefore, it does not allow women to file a divorce case against her husband. Alternatively, 
“women cannot divorce unless she is released or divorced by the man.”95  
Other interviewees such as Zaki Daryabi who is a journalist sees women in the economy 
as an achievement. He believes that these achievements are unavoidable in that women in the 
economic sector of Afghanistan is well noticed. Daryabi gives examples of universities 
particularly focused on women, women’s TV (Zan TV), and many newspapers and radio stations 
that are led by women. These achievements so far are amazing. To him, these accomplishments 
allow women access to resources and money. Comparing the number of achievements with the 
money spent, Daryabi disagrees. He believes that in the amount of money spent compared to 
what Afghan women received, there is not enough progress.96 For instance, regarding EVAW 
law in the country, he believes that “EVAW law passed and was aimed to be implemented in 34 
provinces of Afghanistan still faces challenges.”97 
Another interviewee (whose name will remain anonymous) challenged the ways in which 
donors have allocated their budgets. She assumed that the budget was mostly spent on 
infrastructure or creating a government, that women in government just became a large 
conversation in the past 4-5 years and did not exist before.98 Yalda Royan, a women’s rights 
activist who has experience within donors, government, and NGOs argued that changes in the 
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cities are significant. She agreed with other interviewees on laws being reformed.99 Royan’s 
current position as Deputy Chief of Party in Promote-Musharikat allowed her to talk about her 
experience in this project showing the direction of Promote project funded by USAID. 
Promote project as a five-year program for women in the country is an example of a 
program solely designed for women. Promoting Gender Equity in National Priority Programs 
(USAID-PROMOTE) launched in 2013, implementation started in 2015 and ends in 2020. 
Although I could not ask questions about this project due to its on-going status, I think it is 
legitimately important to discuss how USAID designed the project and the backlash it has 
received globally. SIGAR which oversees USAID activities in Afghanistan shared concerns. In 
communication with USAID, SIGAR exchanged some letters in both 2015 and 2016. In March 
2015, John F. Sopko wrote to USAID requesting information related to the project. He wrote, “I 
am concerned that some very basic programmatic issues remain unresolved and that the Afghan 
women engaged in the program may be left without any tangible benefit upon compellation.”100 
Later in April 2015, USAID responded to the letter, criticizing SIGAR for not having adequate 
information. In that, it also responded to the evaluation mechanism in which USAID rejected the 
fact that the implementation has not started and there were no documents to provide.101 SIGAR 
also criticized USAID for selected partners implementing the project; however, USAID wrote: 
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“SIGAR failed to recognize or acknowledge the importance of Afghan firms and organizations 
in the Promote consortium.”102  
A year later when implementation started, SIGAR closely monitored the project and 
contacted USAID again. In 2016, Sopko in the letter wrote, “I am concerned that a large portion 
of the funding USAID has committed to Promote may go mostly to U.S. contractors, rather than 
spent to benefit Afghan women directly. My concerns are shared by Afghan women 
themselves.”103 SIGAR had sent a group of investigators in 2016 to determine the challenges that 
Afghan women face. Per assessment, Promote is not helping Afghan women.104 Their full report 
has not been released. Royan believes that SIGAR’s report is essential to the project. The 
outcome of SIGAR’s investigation can stop the project if the outcome shows a greater failure. It 
also shows a more significant challenge between USAID’s mechanisms and SIGAR that has a 
greater responsibility holding USAID accountable, controlling the waste, and reporting back to 
the Congress. Communication between USAID and SIGAR also shows the misconception of 
Afghan women, and how bigger gaps are produced that will damage communities and making 
fighting for rights harder. The follow chart describes contractors who currently implement 
Promote. 
Total Budget: 400+ million dollars ($200 million dollars from the US and raise more than $200 
million from other donors)105 
 
                                               
102 USAID, 15. 
 




104 “SIGAR-15-44-SP-IL- with Agency Response.” 
 






Partners and Pillars 
Chemonics 
International 























ensure they have 
the necessary 
skills, experience, 
and knowledge to 
successfully 











Afghan women from 
across the country to 
gain the skills, 
voices, and resources 
to contribute to 
economic growth, to 
reduce poverty levels, 
and to influence 
workplace policies in 
response to the needs 









women to become 
future leaders in 
government, 
business, and civil 
society. Over five 
years, 25,000 women 
with exceptional 
leadership potential 
and commitment to 
positive social change 






















is designed to 
build a cadre of 





(CSOs) from all 







                                               
106 “PROMOTE: Women in Government,” Project Report (Kabul Afghanistan: USAID, August 2017), 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/Women_in_Government_WIG.pdf. 
 
107 “PROMOTE: Women in the Economy,” Project Report (Kabul Afghanistan: USAID, October 2016), 
https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/usaid-promotes-afghan-womens-leadership-economy-awle. 
 




109 “PROMOTE-Scholarships,” Project Report (Kabul Afghanistan, February 2017), 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/PROMOTE_-_Scholarships.pdf. 
 
110 “PROMOTE-Musharikat,” Project Report (Kabul Afghanistan: USAID, November 2017), 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/PROMOTE_-_Musharikat.pdf. 

















Contractors in this chart are criticized by SIGAR, but USAID has not directly mentioned 
them on its website. All partners are required to report back to the Gender Office of USAID. 
USAID has its policy to publish reports and communicate if further information is needed. 
Similarly, this chart shows a duplication. The goals mentioned in each section is not very clear, 
and it is difficult to understand the end goals. Royan, who has a clear understanding of the 
project, believes that given how this project is designed, it cannot help Afghan women in five 
years. There is a small part that focuses on women in the government that may help since it 
aimed to train a total of 3000 girls who would be ready for job opportunities in government 
offices. In reality, three years have passed and this section only trained a total of 150, who have 
hardly been hired in the government offices.116 She sees a greater issue within the project design. 
Instead, if at least ten factories were made, they could help women in the long run, she argued. 
That change could be more acceptable.117 
 Others also argued that women’s rights have not changed in the country. Sayed Muzaffar 
Shah, the Country Director of CCC in Afghanistan said, “fundamentally things have not 
changed. It is because the mentality of the people has not changed, the life of women in domestic 
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level has not changed.”118 He believes that change is made possible by technology, not donors’ 
aid. Women started having access to technology, social media, and TVs. Due to globalization 
and women fighting in other countries, Afghanistan is influenced. As a result, Afghanistan 
started seeing more women working in offices. In contrast, although these women’s entrance into 
the workforce was an achievement, Ehsan Qaane, a researcher in Afghanistan Analyst Network, 
believes that the work environment for women and the number of harassment and sexual assault 
cases are concerning. 119To Qaane, many other examples and the struggle women go through in 
the country does not fulfill the expected outcome.  
 Among these interviewees and others whose arguments are used in the background, there 
is a fundamental confusion between donors, researchers, activists, and implementers. Some 
interviewees from the donor community were not aware of how donors approached women’s 
rights. This confusion also led to researchers being vague in suggesting alternatives. For 
instance, initially, women were hopeful when projects such as Promote launched. However, it 
continued the same mechanisms that other agencies practiced in the past years. All members 
agreed that it is challenging to change the way projects are implemented, yet women’s rights 
remain a struggle for both the international donors and local activists. The government of 
Afghanistan has initiated many programs and is supported by the international community, the 
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2. Is the donors’ aid sufficient or lacking?  
Duplication among donors is one of the reasons donors’ aid is lacking, most of the 
interviewees argued. Donors such as UN agencies and USAID projects implement similar 
thematic areas that show less coordination among donors that choose a limited target area. On 
the one hand, it created a blurred approach among practitioners; on the other hand, it affected the 
impact of projects being implemented. An interviewee (whose name will remain anonymous) 
argued that there are concepts within UN Women under different names and themes; however, 
other donors used the same themes to work in the country.120 In other agencies such as USAID, 
the interviewee believes that USAID does not give projects to national partners; instead, they are 
giving to those that are US based implementers. Within that approach, there are many 
duplications. So far, there has not been a coordination mechanism that would help both donors 
and partners lead their projects differently. Duplications could be the results of different actors 
aimed to contributed something in the country right after the Taliban regime. This goal and 
interest allowed donors a long time to establish a coordination mechanism. Instead, donors aimed 
for short-term results.121 If the amount were spent on a long-term and sustainable projects, the 
change would have been different. 
Another interviewee who worked as an  and currently works with UN Habitat (UNH), 
gave an example of a project in Jalalbad city of Nangarhar province that is distanced from the 
capital. She referenced to skills training projects that were popular among donors earlier. The 
UNH in Kandahar province implemented a project in 2005. This project provided machines, 
training, and materials that would enable these women to learn and produce sellable products. 
                                               






These products were assumed to provide some cash to these women.122 The assumption was that 
women learned embroidery in their childhood, which could be used as a base to strengthen their 
skills for an income. When the training was finished, the machines were given to the trainees. 123 
Similar projects were implemented in other parts of Afghanistan. The World Food Programme 
reported in September 2012 about a project that taught 100 women the same skills that the UNH 
implemented in Kandahar province. This project aimed to teach women new skills while giving 
them enough food during training. The report started with “giving Afghan women the chance to 
learn marketable skills is one way to help Afghanistan on the road to peace and stability, as well 
as food security.”124 The project lasted 6-7 months and helped these women in Kabul. The report 
also included two success stories of women participants. In the report, two women showed a 
greater interest in learning new skills so that they could earn some cash for their families. Farida 
a 38-year-old woman whose husband is a drug addict, was responsible for taking care of her 
family, the report states.125 She said in the report, “I hope that if I learn to sew well, I can make 
good money making dresses for people.”126 These success stories are a normal trend being seen 
on donors websites. It also shows the participant’s satisfaction with the project. On the other 
hand, without a follow-up, or knowing how they used these skills to earn money, in reality, is 
what Mirzad struggles to understand. For instance, in Jalalabad, Mirzad argued that such project 
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failed. It was due to no follow up after the project was finished. She goes further, “if you go to 
any house or camp of IDPs, there are conducted training of tailoring or embroideries, the 
problem with that is all the house in Jalalabad got a tailoring machine. However, you hardly find 
a tailor. The trainings were only three to six months. You cannot train a tailor to be a tailor in 
three months.”127 She believed that learning the skills of tailoring requires more resources and 
longer planning for them to have a better outcome. In later years, women could produce their 
goods and could not make any money except receiving a tailoring machine.  
Mirzad further argued that the amount of money lacks because all the project designs are 
result-based instead of impact-based. By that, donors “want to know how many women got 
trained, how many women participated in the advocacy training or other short period trainings. 
But no one goes back and check if that training had an impact.”128 She includes her experiences 
working in Afghanistan for many years, for different donors and NGOs. In that, she sees 
duplication among donors. For instance, occasional trainings and projects are duplicated and 
repeatedly used the same participants over and over. She further argues that projects funded by 
USAID, and the World Bank similar faces are shown in the trainings and conferences. It is 
because the contacts are not changing. The relationship between the donors and partners remains 
through years. The contact list within the implemented partner remains unchanged. Donors 
maintain their relationship with the partner without any questions because trusting or building a 
new NGO is harder in a situation where all are suffering from corruption, instability, and 
favoritism. Initially, it was difficult for women to understand the concept that was introduced to 
them. Expectations of donors looking for stable and well-managed partners are also high. Faster 
                                               






approaches with less impact are an issue Afghan women face now. Women’s rights remained a 
door for income and NGOs use a business approach to gain more money with less focus on 
women’s lives.  
3. Designing Projects for Afghanistan, failure or not adequate? 
Projects are designed in various ways. Some of them are on the need basis, others are 
designed outside the country, almost all the interviewees agreed. Most of these projects are 
donor-driven as Sayed Muzaffar Shah argues. “Donors are coming with an assessment, most of 
the time their assessments are on assumptions. [So] they do not do based on the grounds reality, 
[nor based on] proper assessment in Afghanistan knowing how much money they want to 
spend.”129 Instead, it is based on how much money is designated to Afghan women. All 
respondents of this research argued that it is one of the reasons donors had less impact in the 
country. With less impact, this is not an effective approach, they argued. This approach also 
allows the NGOs to change their visions and missions based on what specific projects one should 
look. Calling for a proposal usually has a gender indicator, Muzaffar Shah says that the term 
“gender is just symbolic.”130 
A need assessment is not a requirement to award a project or select the right partner. 
When I spoke with Afghans currently working with international agencies, in holding very high 
paid positions, they still do not have access to project designs or awarding process. They told me 
that they do not know how a partner is selected or based on what evidence a project is designed. 
Anosha Ejlasi, who has been working within donor community, claimed that although she works 
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as a senior gender specialist for the UNH, she still does not know how projects are designed or 
how partners are selected.131 
 The way projects are designed for Afghanistan is limited to certain areas, the data shows. 
It is difficult for donors to determine where to award a project. The security situation remains a 
problem in awarding projects in the conflict zones. For instance, UN Women usually does not 
award projects in the conflict provinces. On the one hand, it raises the question of exclusion and 
inclusion of certain groups and ethnic minorities; on the other hand, the impact from the donors’ 
perspective remains within an elite group in provinces with better security. UN Women already 
had projects with CEDAW and UNSCR that failed to be implanted in 34 provinces, but instead, 
are implemented in 24 provinces. They do have a legitimate reason to not but their employee at 
risk due to security conditions. Other donors are more critical, at least of individuals within the 
donor community. A representative from UNH argued that donors do not pay attention to the 
geographical aspect of projects but instead focus on the result reports.132 Employees working in 
IOs and INGOs have health insurance, and they should not be put in the risky provinces since 
that costs them more.133 As discussed before, projects such as Promote and skill trainings are not 
doing in the country. Neither the interviewees nor I know why the same designs are continued 
while knowing that these short trainings are not bringing sustainable change to Afghan women.  
4. Lack of coordination among donors and partners 
Corruption, lawmakers, government officials, and specific elite groups that demand 
donors funding still challenge both the beneficiaries and partners. Similarly, neither donors nor 
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partners are aware of what women need and while also having no coordination before, during, or 
after project implementation.  
Country offices, as Campbell argued before, are the main intermediaries between HQs 
and beneficiaries. Country offices plan the year ahead of time to know where they should choose 
their projects and how. UN Women, for instance, designs its projects every four years and 
consults with government partners and civil society, an interviewee said.134 The respondent from 
this entity clarifies that four years concepts are not enough.135 UN Women also develops its 
yearly work plan and implement its projects based on what the work plan requires. The 
interviewee says, “to be honest, we try and have tried to be as relevant to Afghanistan as 
possible, but I can see there are still shortcomings.”136 UN Women also tries to align its projects 
with government priorities such as the Women’s Economic Empowerment agenda of the 
government, Citizen Charters, or National Solidarity Program. The reason UN Women uses this 
method is to reduce a parallel structure with the government. According to the interviewee, “We 
are here to support, not compete,”137 After Afghanistan’s government developed its Afghanistan 
National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) beginning 2017 through, UN agencies 
came together to develop One UN for Afghanistan that has six thematic areas, coordinate their 
works and work toward selected thematic areas together. This mechanism only helps UN 
agencies in the country, not other individual donors. The platform focuses on six areas such as, 
“norms, food-security, nutrition, and livelihood, health, return and reintegration, and the rule of 
                                               










law.”138 These six thematic areas are trying to go hand-in-hand with ANPDF which would be a 
single coordinating structure in Afghanistan.139 ANPDF is a roadmap for the government of 
Afghanistan that mainly focuses on “peace, security, and ending poverty and achieving self-
reliance.”140 On the one hand, this document allows the government to work more strategically; 
on the other hand, it allows the  UN to work more coherently for the benefit of both the UN 
mission and the people of Afghanistan.  
 There has not been enough evidence to show such platform existed before. UN agencies 
were under attack in past years for its insufficient work in Afghanistan, particularly UN Women. 
This program is hoped to show a new agenda that creates better coordination among donors and 
choosing the most essential thematic areas helping people. Transparency and accountability are 
important mechanisms in this document. The Ministry of Finance has donors aid database 
showing the aid coordination team on how the new approach works. Nonetheless, it is still not 
clear if it will be more transparent since the culture of corruption and waste has been embedded 
in the government for many years. When I worked in the Ministry of Women’s Affairs as a 
Donors Coordination Officer, I noticed that there are parallel and duplication projects among 
donors. For instance, UNDP was implementing almost the same project as Asia Foundation. Asia 
Foundation’s project, that was funded by USAID, was working on the agency’s capacity 
building and developing its five years strategic plan. On the other hand, UNDP started working 
on the agency’s capacity building. Donors are advocating their agendas and competing to 
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implement the most important project. Lack of coordination and duplication are hurting the 
beneficiaries.  
5. Weak monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms 
 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) among the donor community and the NGOs is a 
question of who should be responsible for what they produced and failed on the project 
implementation process. Both donors and partners have M&E mechanisms. These mechanisms 
are usually used to monitor and evaluate a project. NGOs are expected to have a specific policy 
for their M&E procedures, and when the project is awarded, the M&E section is a function 
between the partner’s M&E and the donor that has a separate unite. For instance, in UNH Ejlasi 
does not know what mechanisms are used in the M&E unite. During the interview in Kabul, she 
said: “I cannot give you the right answer on the procedures on how they collect their data.”141 
When I spoke to a DFID representative who almost had the same position, the interviewee was 
aware of all its mechanisms and different standards. It shows that Afghans working within 
donors are not involved as much as the foreigners who are employed in the country offices. All 
interviewees agreed that M&E procedures within donors are weak. For instance, a UN Women 
representative argued that it is difficult to have a proper M&E procedure for many reasons. 
Projects being implemented in the conflict zones are difficult to monitor. The interviewee said, 
“if we cannot travel, we hire a third-party monitoring. We let them go and do the monitoring, 
[or] sometimes we use some NGOs who are present in those areas.” In order to know if a partner 
is transparent, the donor tries to conduct more research on the partners’ background and previous 
projects implemented. Although UN Women hired the third party to monitor the project, it 
awarded a project in a far distanced province. The total of a 100 women was trained in this 
                                               




project based on the report received; however “we called those people,”142 to see if the number 
of trainees was accurate. There were only 50 women involved in the training. The partner was 
asked to train the extra 50 women or return the funding. It is one of those examples were M&E 
fails. The data shows that most of the donors accept the report without doing a real assessment 
and monitor during the project.  
Moreover, Mirzad says that the mechanisms exist on the paper that at least has three to 
four phases. The government has the responsibility to monitor projects, the implementing partner 
has an obligation to submit a M&E report, and the donor itself should have its procedure. 
However, according to Mirzad, “in this process, what is lacking is that we take this process so 
lightly.”143 She argues that monitoring and evaluation are two different processes. Monitoring 
should be used before the problem occurs, whereas evaluation is to see the impact after the 
project is done. She further explains, “what happens [is] that they usually check the last phase 
which is the evaluation part. They [forget] the monitoring phase. It is with the government, with 
the partners, and the donors.144 According to this explanation, if monitoring is not taking place 
during implementation, it will be tough to analyze the quality of a project, and whether or not it 
was executed the best way possible.  
 As soon as the contract is signed between the donor and partner, nothing can be changed 
during implementation. Syed Muzaffer Shah believes that the proposal agreement is an essential 
document for both the donor and partner. “But in most cases, the donors are not concerned about 
how clean and transparent is a project. [if] there is corruption in the project,” especially in 
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USAID projects, they contract with an external M&E (third party) company to evaluate. 
However, these companies are using a “checking the box” strategy. When the report returns to 
the donor and “if they see that the project has met all the requirements that [have] been put in the 
technical proposal than the project is fine.”145 He goes further explaining: what is lacking in this 
procedure is that, one: evaluators do not asses “the impact of a project, [or even] the longer 
impact of a project.” Two: they do not asses the corruption in the project.146 Wafaey147 further 
explains: 
“M&E system is weak especially in the projects implemented in the far distanced areas 
even if the security is not a concern. In the insecure areas, M&E is zero. Getting projects 
in unsecured areas are a tactic for corruption which is not getting implemented. They just 
give [an] unreal report. It became a culture on how to get a project and create a report that 
satisfies the donor and the money remains to the implementers.”148 
 
How donors are accountable to their governments is different than how donors are responsible 
for their beneficiaries. Donor and partner make the argument that it is the technical proposal that 
decide the level of M&E and the impact of a project. If the donor receives everything on-time, 
especially the project report, it is good enough and they have fulfilled their obligations. Not only 
do the donors have weak mechanisms to evaluate their projects, but the Ministry of Economy 
also does not have a steady hand in NGOs functionality in the country. In such, there is not a 
concrete or robust instrument that would allow the government to oversee projects 
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implementation. If one existed, Muzaffer Shah argues, it could help reduce waste. He said, “any 
open window of control in Afghanistan can create more corruption.”149 What he meant is that the 
system got so complex that it cannot easily be understood or solutions cannot be proposed.  
6. Projects for women failed, or practitioners are satisfied? 
 Almost all of the respondents believed that most of the projects failed in the country. This 
argument is not only represented in this research, and there are others that claim the same failure 
of donor projects for women in Afghanistan. Certain factors cause projects to fail. The data 
regarding good and failed projects explains that most projects were not successful. However, 
what the data does not show is the assessment of how the project failed or what the character of a 
failed project is. Interviewees argued the failure of a project stems from the project design and to 
how a partner is selected. If the project is not designed well based on the needs assessment, it is 
very difficult to see the impact. That is a failure.  
 Some of the donors could not answer the question of how many projects failed and why. 
For instance, Ejlasi said during the interview that she does not have enough information and 
cannot assume anything. On the other hand, UN Women argued that there “have been projects 
that did not have as good impact as the amount worth. It is hard to name. I think there are quite a 
few.”150 Another interviewee said, “I think there are so many projects that they have money and 
they are under the pressure of their HQs, to spend as much money as can to be spent on this 
thematic area. For formality, they ask for some questioners, and they ask for some forms to be 
[completed]. These forms are filed [in a room] with [an] air conditioner.”151 The room with AC 
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here refers to the evaluation of training that most of the time is not real. The M&E officer in 
UNH argued that “there are so many projects that failed.”152 She gives the example of projects 
being copied from India and Indonesia replicated in Afghanistan. For instance, Community 
Banking is a community process in which people get together and the purpose is to multiple 
money to help others. They use that money to buy a cow or sheep or even rice. “I think the 
implementation started in Afghanistan in 2002, but it failed badly.”153 Further, when I asked the 
interviewee to name some failed projects, Royan gave an example of a project in the Takhar 
province. Musharikat, where Royan is working, awarded a training based project. The donor 
noticed that the report coming back shows one picture for three days of training. Such practice 
means that the training was conducted on only one day but reported in three days. The signatures 
of participants did not match, Royan said. Out of 150 participants, 25 were correct, the remaining 
did not match. When Royan and her team followed up with the “participants,” most of them did 
not know about the training. Royan stopped the project.154 There are many reasons why the 
project failed. A project can fail dramatically and become hard to recover. In contrast, an NGO 
sometimes cannot pay a donor back or conduct better training using its budget. Data shows that 
M&E mechanisms are weak and the government does not have the capacity to overlook all of the 
projects. It is a loss to the beneficiaries and the failure of donors who are arguing and demanding 
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Explanation and analysis 
 
The paper initially assumed that there had not been enough progress on women’s 
rights in Afghanistan. It was also assumed that embedded corruption within local partners is 
an obstacle for women related programs’ impact. However, the paper found it less true. 
Through this research I recognized that laws exist, policies are formed and reforms to laws are 
in progress. However, the problem is the implementation gap between laws and practices. 
Furthermore, the research also shows that there has been a disagreement between donors and 
partners. Both donors’ and partners’ reaction to the research showed confusion among them. 
Most interviewees responded with uncertainty that women’s rights is going in the right 
direction, but the research found is less promising. 
 The government of Afghanistan, since its initial establishment, produced many laws, 
regulations, specific policies and mechanisms to protect women and make sure that women 
have equal rights before the law in the country. The government has also worked to facilitate 
more women in the government and leadership levels so that it symbolizes their commitment 
to the international world. Most of these mechanisms have not been fulfilled; for instance, 
NAPWA was designed for 10 years, but its impact within the ministries is not what was 
expected. In many conferences and international gatherings to advocate for further funding, 
the government showed its achievements and made sure that women do not lose what they 
have gained. It is unfortunate that women’s rights and the amount of achievement is still 
fragile, not sustainable. Interviewees were hopeful about the future, but they were hesitant 
about the sustainability of these outcomes.  
 Furthermore, donors in the country also seem lost. Although some authors argued that 
country offices are a bridge between the HQs and the beneficiaries, these country offices are 
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still not designed in a way that they can receive local feedback, or replace their theory on 
changing women’s rights in Afghanistan. Country offices in Afghanistan are well equipped 
with the best-armored cars, and buildings that are safe during an attack. What is missing is 
that local beneficiaries or even NGOs cannot have access to these offices. There is an elite 
group of both women and men that have a direct connection with these offices. These women 
advocates cannot represent what women struggle in the far distanced areas (rural women). As 
many of the interviewees in the research mentioned, almost similar faces are shown in 
international conferences, national advocacy meetings, and governmental activities, and it is 
hard to find new faces. This approach damages minority groups ,who have been doing 
outstanding work in their communities. Donors recently started coordinating meetings so that 
they do not create a parallel structure with the government but compliment the government 
programs. Donors also did not allow the government to interfere in their projects because they 
were more accountable to their HQs and their governments.  
 Local NGOs used these opportunities and tried to use women’s rights as a tool to gain 
more money. When I conducted the interviews, they show that there is no corruption 
assessment within NGOs implementing women related projects, and they also show that  
NGOs are not accountable for their beneficiaries. In addition, NGOs are donor-driven. Some 
of the authors previously argued that it has happened in South America when feminist projects 
started producing more NGOs for gender equality and women’s rights. NGOs started 
competing against each other which did not allow them to coordinate their initiatives better. 
Most of them would not mention where they received the grants so that the other organization 
would not have had access to the donor. These NGOs also learned how to produce the best 
reports that could satisfy the donor. The best reports showing success stories are enough for 
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Donors, and so that they do not have to leave their offices. NGOs also learned how to avoid 
monitoring and government assessment. Throughout the years, NGOs learned how to receive 
government, private, and donors’ grants to work in different fields. It became a source of 
income and I was told that most of these individuals have been using the non-profit funds to 
establish their private companies. 
 If this ecosystem continues, this will increase insufficient programs in the future. The 
government does not have the capacity to monitor or hold donors/NGOs accountable. On the 
other hand, they also argued that donor funding should not be stopped. Project designs, 
implementation mechanisms, and more diverse approaches should replace what has been 
practiced in the past years. They believed that better coordination among donors, government 
entities, and NGOs are possible only if they conduct an assessment on their previous work, 
and how they failed throughout the years. Therefore, this will allow them to come up with a 
coherent planning and more sustainable agenda that can help women in the long run.  
Conclusion 
 
 Throughout this paper, I have argued that donors and international aid in Afghanistan 
for women is inefficiently spent. I developed a roadmap that is looking at the theoretical 
framework of transactional literature that focused on how policies and strategies were developed 
by the Western empires aiming to change the developing countries. For instance, Makau Mutua’s 
argument demonstrates the ways in which these policies have been practiced in different 
countries. Mutua has discussed the issue of victimization of developing countries and the 
Western programs and policies as protectors. Such dynamic also showed in Afghanistan with 
many women related projects. Other literatures such as Campbell’s argument in Burundi is also 
echoed in Afghanistan. While many programs are designed to have women in the peace process, 
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donors are not accountable toward their beneficiaries but HQs. The data also reinforced the 
organizational and accountability literature focused on NGOs and partner relationships. For 
instance, writers such as Alvarez and Campbell showed examples of South American NGOs and 
NGOs in Burundi with similar trends in producing more feminist NGOs for women 
empowerment.  
 Initially, the research assumed that the vivid corruption within local NGOs, women 
related projects are not successful enough. However, assessing these theories in Afghanistan, the 
problem is more complicated than what I have assumed. Data in this research demonstrated the 
overarching problem within the donor community, the shortcomings of government programs, 
and local NGOs accountability toward beneficiaries and donor-driven practices. With the 
complexity and issues within such an ecosystem, my data also showed confusion among 
practitioners in the country. Donors cannot suggest alternatives and it is hard to receive local 
feedback, while the government cannot hold donors accountable, and partners start misusing 
funds allocated for women in the country. Creating more challenges and cultural backlashes 
against Afghan women is a long process to overcome but allows NGOs, political actors, and 
parliamentarians to gain more money.  
Further research on this could also examine how paradigm of laws and policies 
established are not practical. Although they are stated on paper, it is hard to follow in practice. 
More implementation gaps should be reduced; research studies should be conducted in the 
country, considering laws and policies in place for women. From a donor perspective, Sally 
Engle Merry’s argument on the gap between cosmopolitan awareness of rights and local 
actors to the families are should be assessed. She mainly argues that it is important to take 
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human rights approaches in a developing country. And in that, community leaders, local 
players, and activists are important for “global arenas down and from local arenas up.”155 
Finally, an impact assessment is needed to measure the effectiveness of the 
implementation process, success or failure of women’s rights projects, and follow up methods 
after the project is completed. More research is also needed to look at “Promote” project and 
how it has been implemented since 2015. “Promote” project is the most famous program of 




1. Donors and international aid should be monitored and evaluated by every single 
project related to women. For instance, there should not be a third party evaluator 
involved in M&E procedures in USAID projects. Most of USAID projects are 
monitored by a third party who uses a “checking the box” strategy. USAID relies on 
the report coming from an evaluator that satisfies USAID’s requirement. Weak 
monitoring and evaluation increase the level of corruption within a project. USAID 
should also stop contracting its projects to corporates. Practicing a business model in 
these projects are not responding to the needs of Afghan women. The rights-based 
approach is needed instead of a fast service delivery approach.   
2. USAID, UN agencies, and other international donors should establish a coordination 
mechanism in order to reduce parallel procedures and policies. A collective effort 
with a better target area should be discussed with main actors such as the Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs and other national implementers. In the meantime, UNDP should 
                                               
155 Merry, Sally Engle. “Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle.” Dialogues on 




not have similar projects with UN Women or USAID. Duplication damages 
beneficiaries. Women’s rights is not a competition in the country but a need to end 
violence and empower women more sustainably. Women’s rights and gender equality 
cannot be based on a business mindset, there has to be sustainability involved. 
Therefore, short-term trainings such as “Promote” and UN Women projects that are 
not sustainable and cannot empower women in the long run.  
Government: 
 
1. The government of Afghanistan should work hand-in-hand with local actors in order to 
practice the role of law. Passing laws favoring women is not enough, nor using women 
symbolically in the government offices that cannot represent women in all sectors of 
the society. Women leaders in key positions should understand the fundamental 
struggle of a woman in the country. Political division within the government damages 
a strong Afghan Women Minister. Ministry of Women’s Affairs should be led by a 
well-educated and organized individual so that the Ministry can have the capacity to 
monitor and evaluate women related projects and hold NGOs accountable for their 
misuse of funding.  
2. The Ministry of Economy has to establish a mechanism to evaluate programs that are 
implemented in different sectors. Receiving project reports are not showing NGOs 
accountability or transparency, the government is obligated to hold NGOs accountable 
for their practices and policies. NGOs who have gained more money and individuals 
becoming rich should be stopped from receiving projects. Women’s rights is not a 







1. NGOs should stop receiving projects for their gains, instead focusing on the 
beneficiaries. Women’s rights should not remain symbolic for both women in the 
government and human rights defenders. It should be a value, and the gender budget 
should be more transparent in both government and independent organizations. If 
NGOs are not accountable toward the government, they should have better 
mechanisms to be accountable toward their beneficiaries.  
2. NGOs should establish a coordination mechanism and work together so that they all 
can put pressure on the donors for a better project design and better M&E practices. 
This will help the donors as well as the beneficiaries. NGOs are currently looking at 
women as a type of business. NGOs privatization is harm to gender equality in the 
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APENDEX 1.  
Interviewees in the Research 
• Interviewee 1: Anosha Ejlasi is a Senior Gender Advisor at UN Habitat (UNH. She is 
responding to all questions based on her experience at Women for Afghan Women and 
her current position in the UNH.  
• Interviewee 2: Ab-Wadood Pedram is an Executive Director in Human Rights and 
Eradication Violence Organization (HREVO). He has  experience in activism, donor-
partners relationship, and many human rights projects. 
• Interviewee 3: Anonymous (DFID, British Embassy), the participant from the British 
Embassy requested to remain completely anonymous and the interview was not recorded. 
The information from this interview will be used as background information.  
• Interviewee 4: Anonymous (UN Women), a UN Women employee who has enough 
experience in making a yearly strategy and action plan, is involved in awarding projects, 
and has a direct connection to local partners.  
• Interviewee 5: Anonymous (DFID British Embassy), this is the second DFID employee 
who requested to remain anonymous. The information will be used as background 
information.  
• Interviewee 6: Anonymous, this participant remained completely anonymous and 
requested to neither be recorded, nor have direct quotes in the research. The interviewee 
responded to questions related to NGOs that implemented women-related projects in 
different provinces and talked about accountability and corruption within NGOs. 
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• Interviewee 7: Carmela Weber is a former USAID employee in Afghanistan. She 
worked as a decision maker in awarding projects and overseeing and reporting back to 
the main office.  
• Interviewee 8: Hassan Wafaey is a Research Manager in the Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit (AREU). His background researching in different fields allows him to 
answer questions related to M&E procedures, donor awarding processes, follow up, and 
accountability structures.  
• Interviewee 9: M.Ehsan Qaane is a researcher who has  experience in UN mechanisms 
and treaties. He is currently working with the Afghanistan Analyst Network. He 
responded to questions related to M&E, aid distribution, agenda setting, and government 
laws and regulations.  
• Interviewee 10: Mobarez Rashedi is Afghanistan’s former Minister of Counter 
Narcotics. He has responded to questions related to government relations with donors and 
how donor approaches are lacking in the country concerning women’s rights. 
• Interviewee 11: Mehri Mirzad is an M&E specialist currently with UNH who answered 
questions based on her entrepreneurship background and her experience with Zardozi. 
• Interviewee 12: Syed Muzaffer Shah is a researcher and the Country Director of Center 
for Civilians in Conflict (CCC) in Afghanistan. He has experience among both INGOs 
and local NGOs focused on women’s rights. His input in this research comes from his 
background in anti-corruption research and work with Independent Joint Anti-corruption 
Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) of Afghanistan as well as his full 
understanding of donors expectations in the country. He responded to specific questions 
related to both NGOs and donor policies, mechanisms, and procedures. 
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• Interviewee 13: Yalda Royan is a Deputy Chief of Party, implementing PROMOT 
project funded by USAID. She has experience with Asia Foundation, UN Women, and 
currently with USAID, and she respond to all questions asked. 
• Interviewee 14: Zaki Daryabi is a journalist who has worked in Afghanistan for many 
years. He is currently the Editor and Chief of Etilaat Roz (Afghan newspaper). He 
responded to questions related to M&E and donors-government relations.  
 
 
 
 
 
